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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 14/07/2011

Accident number: 438

Accident time: 13:20

Accident Date: 19/02/2006

Where it occurred: LK-241 SL,
Periyavillan village,
Valikamam, Southwest
Jaffna
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Country: Sri Lanka

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: 20/02/2006

ID original source: None

Name of source: Demining group

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: P4 AP blast Fuze

Ground condition: not applicable

Date record created: 16/03/2007

Date last modified: 14/07/2011

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: SL Grid 0113885
0507031

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
no independent investigation available (?)
inadequate communications (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The demining group made their internal investigation available in 2011. Its conversion into a
DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is
editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
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File date: 20.02.2006
INVESTIGATION REPORT OF DEMINING ACCIDENT IN JAFFNA 19 FEBRUARY 2006
Summary
Accident date:19th February 2003, Time:13:20
Location: Mine collection point in minefield LK-241, SL Grid 0113885 0507031, Periyavillan,
Valikamam Southwest, Jaffna
Event: P4 MK1 booster blast in the hands of the team leader
Casualty: [the Victim] [Demining group] ID No 170, Position: Demining team leader
Organisation: [Demining Group]

Introduction
This report covers the findings of an internal investigation into the circumstances and events
of an accident to a team leader, [the Victim] who was carrying out mine clearance duties with
[Demining Group] in Jaffna District on the 19th February 2006.
History of the Minefield
The minefield LK-241 is a defensive barrier laid by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) some time
during 1993. The mines were laid in accordance with methodology employed widely by SLA
Engineers throughout Sri Lanka protecting a Forward Defence Line (FDL). Most of the terrain
is open ground with few trees and bushes. The mine type laid into the minefield is Pakistan
P4 MK1 type antipersonnel mine.
Some demining has taken place by untrained independent local labour. According to the
survey information ([Demining group] minefield report LK-241, task ID JA-11), the local labour
removed and destroyed 50 mines in the past from the area. During their clearance process,
an accident occurred to one of the local labour. Further, 5 bulls have stepped on a mine in the
minefield. The [Demining group] had been carrying out mine clearance activities for 2 months
on this task when the accident occurred.
Details of the Accident
On 19th February 2006 at 13:20 hours, team leader [the Victim] was carrying out an inventory
of found boosters of P4 MK1 antipersonnel mines in a mine collection point located in the
minefield LK-241, in Periyavillan village. He had started the work day normally at 08:00 and
ever since worked 50 min at a time following a ten minute break and had a 30 min breakfast
break in the minefield as well.
Already in the morning start up, together with the team members he discovered new piles of
emptied shells of the P4 antipersonnel mines and boosters lying on the ground in the
minefield, abandoned to the area by an unknown person. The bodies of the antipersonnel
mines were emptied from explosive content but the separate bottom plates of the mines still
contained the explosive booster button attached to them. Team leader [the Victim] ordered
the section leaders to collect the boosters carefully into plastic buckets from the cleared lanes
of the minefield and transport them to the mine collection point.
Altogether 75 boosters were collected from these piles during the work day and moved to the
mine collection point. At 13:20 hours, he was counting the total amount of the found P4
boosters before being transported away from the minefield, to be later disposed in a central
demolition site. While handling one of the P4 boosters, it exploded in his hands.
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The explosion caused injuries to his left hand and right hand fingers and to the top of his left
eye. The team members heard the explosion and the emergency whistle blast by the section
leaders. The paramedics arrived to the minefield in a minute and gave first aid to [the Victim].
The operational headquarters was informed about the accident. The medical procedure
continued with an evacuation by an ambulance to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital according to
the [Demining group] standing operating procedures.
In the hospital, a doctor conducted a full medical examination, treated minor injuries in his
face and X-ray photos were taken. At 16:30 hours, the Victim]’s hands were operated.
Demining Site
In the internal investigation, the demining site was found well laid and marked in accordance
with the [Demining group] SOP. The site was non-operational in the late afternoon of the
inspection and therefore the tools, personal protective equipment and recovered explosive
accessories had been removed from the accident location.
As anticipated, there was no crater caused by the blast in the mine collection point due to the
small explosive content and the fact that the explosion occurred in the hands of the team
leader. Altogether four piles of abandoned emptied plastic bodies of the landmines were
witnessed on site, containing approximately remains of 200 P4 MK1 antipersonnel mines. The
boosters with yet explosive content, had been transported by the demining team from the site
away to the [Demining group] mine store.
[Demining group] will leave the investigation of this unauthorized and dangerous, private
disarming project to the police. There are rumours of an unknown young person appearing to
the area after [Demining group] demining team is not present on site, and by using a small
mammothy [sic], the stranger removes antipersonnel mines and removes explosives from
them. [Demining group] has handed out a report to the police in the issue.
Personal Protective Equipment
It is a standard practise in the [Demining group] to wear personal protective equipment whilst
operating in the mined area. At the time of the incident, the injured team leader was wearing
standard uniform trousers and shirt, leather canvas boots and a fragmentation vest. The team
leader indeed was found not wearing a visor. The team leader experienced minor injuries to
his head and injuries to his hands. There is not protective gear to safeguard the hands of the
demining personnel in use in the demining. Furthermore, it is advised not to wear gloves
when handling landmines, to ensure a firm and yet gentle grip of the device in hand, in order
to not drop it during handling.
Training and Experience of Personnel
The responsibilities of [Demining group] demining personnel are clearly outlined in [Demining
group] SOP for Sri Lanka. Team Leader [the Victim] was trained as a deminer in October
2003 and has been given bi-annual refresh training sessions until the present day. He has
operated as a section leader from July 2004 and as a team leader March 2005. He is an
experienced deminer and a leader.
Medical Support
The [Demining group] methodology detailed in Sri Lankan SOP calls for at least one trained
paramedic working on the site to be able to provide first aid. In this case, there were two
paramedics and an ambulance ready and waiting with a designated driver. The level of
medical support and evacuation available on the day of the accident was appropriate to the
needs and was in accordance with the SOP.
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Contributing Factors of the Accident
1. [Demining group] SOP
The internal investigating team finds that the methodology detailed in [Demining group] SOP
did not contribute to the accident.
2. Application of SOP by the team leader involved
It is the opinion of the internal investigating team that the application of the SOP by the injured
team leader, did not contribute to the accident. However, by wearing a visor according to the
SOP, occurred facial injuries might have been avoided.
3. Command and control structure
The structure was found to be in order and in line with the SOP. The communication from the
field to the operational headquarters was appropriate and accurate, however the investigating
team did not witness a phone call taken to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital prior the
transportation of the injured team leader. The experienced delay in taking an X-ray photo
before the operation, might have been avoided by calling the hospital emergency already
from the minefield or during the evacuation. According to the doctor however, the lack of prior
communication between the paramedics and the hospital personnel did not affect the
treatment.
4. Environmental conditions
There is evidence to suggest that environmental conditions were a contributing factor to the
accident, such as:
The unauthorized and untrained person(s) have removed landmines in the area, possibly
applying a rough removal method (a mammothy). A rough removal of the antipersonnel mine
itself may damage the booster and thereby make it more sensitive.
If the internal components of the mine are damaged prior or during the demining process,
mine can function in an unpredicted way.
If the pressurized spring and firing pin have unsuccessfully functioned and are thereby
leaning against the explosive button prior to unscrewing the booster, unscrewing it will
damage the booster.
Trails of seemingly violent disarming technique of the landmines was witnessed on site. The
disarming was carried out by unscrewing the booster from the bottom and cutting the
pressure plate off by knife to separate the top and bottom parts of the mine body in order to
remove the explosives.
Abandoning the remaining parts of the landmines by throwing them away to the minefield
under a direct sunlight. Exposing the booster to a direct sunlight, will have an effect on the
booster by heating it up and in theory, make it more sensitive.
Conclusions
The cause of the explosion is unknown. The booster was finally initiated by the hand of the
team leader. There is no evidence nor there is a reason in vicinity, why that handling would
have been rough. It is common knowledge within the demining team leaders, that the
explosive content in the small booster button, is more sensitive than the one used in the body
of the mine; in fact it is called an initiation charge in the training. However, a normal handling
of the booster should not be dangerous at all.

4

One or many of the environmental conditions mentioned above, may have caused the booster
explosion.
Internal Investigation Team, Jaffna 20.02.2006
Signed [Name removed] Operations Manager, [Name removed] Internal Quality Assurance
Officer

Attachments: [held on file]
Annex A: Map of the accident location
Annex B: Photos of injured team leader [showing fragment injuries on the left eyelid, right
cheek, left upper lip and chin. See medecial report.]
Annex C: Statement by the injured team leader
Annex D: Photos of disarmed antipersonnel mine plastic bodies
Annex E: Medical Report page 1
Annex F: Medical Report page 2
Annex G: P4 MK1 AP mine: Exerpt from Jane’s Mines 2002

Victim Report
Victim number: 585

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor
Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Face; severe Hands
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Fingers
COMMENT: See Medical Report

Medical report
“…injuries to his left hand and right hand fingers [hands required surgery] and to the top of
his left eye”.
A medical report included the note:

5

And recorded that the tips of fingers had been amputated.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Unavoidable because the investigators found
that the Victim was working correctly t approved SOPs and that the detonation was most
likely caused by unpredictable damage to the fuze rather than inappropriate handling.
However, the Victim was not wearing a visor and as a field supervisor it was his responsibility
to set a good example, so the secondary cause is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy
because the Victim was not wearing the required PPE.
The demining group’s internal investigation appears to show a professional desire to be
objective which is appreciated, and the quality of the report is unusual for Sri Lanka, where
detailed accident reports are rare.
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